We present two different mathematical models that examine the role of cellular evolution in the development and treatment of cancer. The first is a Lotka-Volterra model of an invasive cancer subjected to chemotherapy that demonstrates rapid evolution of drug-resistant phenotypes. The second model represents a major refinement of the first one with the objective of producing a simple, but realistic model of carcinogenesis. It is a consumer-resource model (consumers = normal + mutuant cells, resource = glucose). We conclude that if mutant cells are not allowed to evolve, they will not ordinarily progress to cancer. However, if accumulating mutations allow cellular evolution and successful adaptation to proliferation constraints, normal cells will develop into invasive cancer. We find this progression is possible because normal cellular populations are not at an evolutionarily stable state and so are subject to invasion by more fit phenotypes.
The Evolutionary Game
In a conventional game, a rational player's objective is to choose a strategy that maximizes his payoff. A game consists of players, strategies and strategy sets, payoffs, and rules for determining how the strategies employed by the players result in their respective payoffs. Unlike optimization theory, which is dominated by the concept of a maximum, game theory has a variety of solution concepts for predicting the game's outcomes and the players' optimal choice of strategies [e.g., Min-Max (von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) ), Nash (Nash (1951) ), Pareto optimal (Pareto (1896)), and Stackelberg (Von Stackelberg (1952) )].
Evolution by natural selection is an evolutionary game in the sense that it has players, strategies, strategy sets, and payoffs. The players are the individual organisms. Strategies are heritable phenotypes. A player's strategy set is the set of all evolutionarily feasible strategies. Payoffs in the evolutionary game are expressed in terms of individual fitness, where fitness is defined as the expected per capita growth rate for a given strategy and ecological circumstance. The fitness of an individual directly influences changes in the strategy's frequency within the population as that strategy is passed from generation to generation. Evolution, then, has to do with the survival of a given strategy within a population of individuals using potentially many different strategies.
Several features distinguish evolutionary games from classical games. In classical game theory, the focus is on strategies used by the players that optimize their payoffs. In the evolutionary game, the focus is on strategies that will persist through time. Through births and deaths, the players come and go, but their strategies are passed on from generation to generation. In classical game theory, the players choose their strategies from a well-defined strategy set given as part of the game definition. In the evolutionary game, players generally inherit their strategies and occasionally acquire a novel strategy as a mutation. The strategy set is determined by physical and environmental constraints that may change with time. In classical game theory, each player may have a separate strategy set and separate payoffs associated with its strategies. In the evolutionary game, there will be groups of evolutionarily identical individuals who share the same strategy set and experience the same expected payoffs from using the same strategies. In classic game theory, rationality or self-interest provides the optimizing agent that encourages players to select sensible strategies. In the evolutionary game, natural selection serves as the agent of optimization.
Darwin used logical verbal arguments to understand evolution. Today, we think of evolution in terms of genetics, which involves the study of inheritance of genes from one generation to the next. Genetics seems to provide the ultimate tool for studying evolution, yet it is a curious fact that Darwin presented his theory before he knew of the discovery of genes by Mendel (1866) . It was not until the 1930s that Fisher (1930) , Wright (1931) , Dobzhansky (1937) , and others combined evolution and genetics into what is known as the Modern Synthesis (Mayer and Provine (1980) ). Although genetics has provided a framework for understanding evolution, it is not a necessary framework because Darwin's postulates do not require any specific mechanism of inheritance. The particular non-genetic view of the evolutionary process used here is based on methods that have appeared in the literature. See for example Brown and Vincent (1987) , Vincent et al. (1993) , Vincent et al. (1996) , and Vincent and Vincent (2000) . This article represents one of the first applications using this approach to model cancer.
Evolutionary Models
In general, the strategies (heritable characteristics) used by the players in the evolutionary game are vectors. However for this article we will make the simplifying assumption that they are scalars designated by u i . All the different scalar strategies currently in the population are represented by the vector
where n s is the total number of different strategies. For each strategy in the population u i , there is an associated number of players x i who possess it. Different strategies in the population define differences among individual players. Thus there are n s different types of players represented by the vector
The exponential nature of unregulated growth puts population models into a special class of dynamical systems in which the right-hand sides, representing the rate of change in x i , are always multiplied by x i ; that is, the equations used to model population dynamics are of the forṁ
where
is, by definition, the individual fitness for players x i using strategy u i . Strategies have the potential to evolve to any value allowed under genetic and physical constraints. These constraints define a subset of strategy space designated by U ⊆ R. We use the notation u ∈ U to denote the requirement that every strategy u i must lie in U. The strategy space U must be specified as part of a particular model since it will often play an important role in the types of solutions obtained.
A unique feature of the differential equation system is that as long as H i is continuous in its arguments, and as long as u cannot change discontinuously, if positive values are chosen for x i , motion is confined to the positive orthant. However, it is possible for x i → 0 as t → ∞, so that equilibrium solutions lie in the nonnegative orthant
Clearly, all motion for any physically realizable population system must lie in X ; that is, any solution to (1) that begins in X must remain in X for all future time. The fitness of a given individual in a population of evolutionarily identical individuals is conveniently expressed using a fitness generating function (G-function) first introduced by Vincent and Brown (1984) . The G-function allows us to work with any number of individuals using different strategies without the need for explicitly writing a fitness function for each one. A G-function contains a virtual variable, v, with the property that setting the virtual variable equal to the strategy used by any player in the population results in the fitness function for that player. That is
The G-function simplifies working with the equations of motion. They are now written asẋ
with no need to explicitly specify the fitness function for each n s different types of players. The G-function may be thought of as describing the evolutionary potential for all evolutionarily identical individuals in a community. It also provides a conceptual advantage for understanding system evolution. A plot of G(v, u, x) vs. v for fixed u, x provides the adaptive landscape upon which evolution takes place. An additional feature of the G-function is that it lends itself to the development of strategy dynamics. Strategy dynamics result from the fact that there is always some variability in the actual strategies used by the players identified by x i . This variability results in a different fitness for each strategy and any fitness advantage results in evolution among the players identified by x i . In this context, u i is thought of as the mean strategy for x i . Because of this variability it can be shown (Vincent et al. (1993) ) that to first order, strategies evolve according tȯ
where σ i is related to the variance in strategies among individuals x i . As is often the case, if equilibrium solutions exist to (2) and (3) then such a solution may represent the end result of evolution. For additional details, see Vincent et al. (1993) , Vincent et al. (1996) , Cohen et al. (1999) , and Vincent and Brown (2005) .
Applying Control to a Simple Cellular Model
Normal functioning tissue within a multicellular organism can be viewed as an ecological community composed of several coexisting, distinctly different cellular populations x i . There are several possible adaptive parameters that could be used for the strategy u i . For example, u i could represents the number of glucose transporters in the cell membrane. However we make no such distinction in this model. The G-function is given by:
where R is intrinsic growth rate common to all cells, K(v) is carrying capacity, and a(v, u j ) determines the competitive effect on an individual from all the different strategies used in the population. This Lotka-Volterra model, frequently used as an evolutionary example in the literature (Case (1982) ), (Roughgarden (1983) ), (Rummel and Roughgarden (1983) ) is not representative of any known cellular model. We use it here simply because it is well known, yet it is illustrative of typical results. A more realistic cellular model is given in the next section.
The following distribution functions (Vincent et al. (1993) ) are used to represent the different values for K and a obtained under given strategy choices
where K m and β are constants and the σ variables denote variances in the distribution functions due to the environment. By varying the environmental parameter σ K , associated with the carrying capacity of a given cell type, the dynamical system can have equilibrium solutions composed of one or more cell types. The corresponding strategies are those that can coexist in the population of cells.
For our model, consider the following parameter values to represent the environment for normal cells
In this situation, n s = 1 and for a given u, there is only one non-zero equilibrium solution to the system (2). Choosing different strategies will result in different equilibrium values. For example u 1 = 0 results in a normal cell population of x * 1 = 100. However this solution is not evolutionarily stable as it can be displaced by introducing another mutant cell population (x 2 even at small numbers) using the strategy u 2 = 1. We seek an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) that has the property that it can not be displaced by introducing a mutant strategy. We can obtain such a strategy for this set of parameters by simply picking any strategy (e.g., u 1 = 0) and letting it evolve according to the system of equations (2) and (3). The equilibrium solution to this set of equations is u * 1 = 1.213 and x * 1 = 83.2 and it is an ESS solution. We assume this to be the strategy employed by normal cells within a multicellular organism. However, the normal cellular populations will remain evolutionarily stable only so long as the environmental conditions do not change. In the context of our model, carcinogenesis is the result of perturbations in the stability of the cellular or extracellular components of this environment.
With this model, if we increases σ K from the value given above to σ K = √ 12.5 (e.g., due to damage or changes in surrounding tissue), we have previously shown (Vincent et al. (1993) ) that there exists two equilibrium solutions to (2). As a consequence, if we introduce a mutant cell at some strategy other than 1.213, it can coexist. In fact if we allow both the normal cells and mutant cells to evolve according to (2) and (3), with n s = 2, σ 1 > 0, σ 2 > 0, we would arrive at an ESS composed of two strategies (the normal cells would no longer be at 1.213). However normal cells, because of their low basal mutation rate, are limited in their ability to evolve significantly within the lifetime of the host, whereas, mutant tumor cells typically possess an increased mutation rate (due to alterations in DNA repair, chromosomal stability, or a mutagenic environment) have no such limitation and can evolve to an equilibrium condition. This is incorporated into the integration of (2) and (3) by setting σ 1 = 0 (no evolution of normal cells) and σ 2 = 0.25 (evolution allowed for the mutant tumor cells). The mutant cells are introduced in small numbers at a strategy different than the normal cell strategy with the normal cells at their carrying capacity (in the absence of cancer cells). Using the initial conditions
we find that, over time, the mutant cells evolve into an invasive cancer with the final conditions (t f = 500 days) We model the treatment of a cancer population that has reached steady state values by using cell-specific drugs to eliminate the cancer by adding an appropriate "harvesting" term so that the G-function becomes where K h is a term expressing the level of drug dosage,ū is the cancer cell strategy at which the drug is most effective and σ h is the variance in effectiveness. The following values are used
Starting with the final conditions listed above and integrating (2) and (3) with the G-function defined by (8), it is found that cytotoxic chemotherapy is effective initially, but the cancer cells ultimately recover because they can evolve to a new equilibrium state illustrated in the first frame of Fig. 2 . The net effect is that rather than curing the cancer, the cell specific drug caused the cancer to evolve to a new form that is now highly resistant to the current and any similar therapeutic strategies. This is illustrated in Fig. 3 by the fact that the cancer cells are again sitting at a local maximum on the adaptive landscape. Note that the normal cells are at a fitness less than zero resulting in a zero equilibrium population. These results are essentially identical to evolution of multi-drug resistance observed in treated human tumors (Ichihashi and Kitajima (2001) ) and (Matsumoto et al. (1997) ). In summary, tumor cells, because of their ability to evolve, adapt to chemotherapy and resistant populations readily emerge. Ultimately, the tumor regrows as the resistant populations proliferate rendering the therapy ineffective. In other words, any therapy relying solely on tumor cytotoxic effects will be curative only if it is sufficiently effective to overcome the tumor phenotypic diversity and kill all proliferative cells in a time period sufficiently short to prevent evolution of resistance. From these results, we conclude that while a therapeutic strategy that relies solely on killing tumor cells (without altering critical system parameters) may be effective in reducing tumor size, the model clearly demonstrates that the cancer will inevitably rebound unless all proliferative cells within the population are eliminated.
Modeling Carcinogenesis as an Evolutionary Game
Carcinogenesis is a multistep transition from normal tissue to premalignant lesions to invasive cancer driven by accumulating mutations that produce new phenotypes better adapted to proliferation within the extant microenvironment. Each favorable mutation provides a cellular proliferative advantage that results in clonal expansion. Eventually a maximally adapted cellular species emerges from this mosaic of populations producing an invasive cancer. For this reason carcinogenesis is often described as "somatic evolution." Our objective here is to describe this process quantitatively using evolutionary game theory. Gatenby (1991) introduced a mechanistic normal-mutant cell model that included the dynamics of glucose uptake. Glucose was used as the critical substrate because it is well studied and sufficient data are available for parameter estimates.
In this model x i represents the number of cells and u i represents the number of glucose transporters in the cell membrane. In terms of a G-function the population dynamics for such a consumer-resource model is of the general forṁ
were R is the amount of glucose available.
In developing a G-function for Gatenby's model, we modified it by introducing an inner-specific competition, accounted for any number of different cell types, n s and then convert it to an evolutionary model by identifying the glucose transporters as the adaptive parameter.
2 (normalized to one at the mean value).
This allowing us to write the G-function for the population dynamics as
were B, converts substrate quantity to proliferation, K(v) limits growth, a j (v, u) is the competition term, and the last term represents a Michaelis-Menten uptake (with a constant R 0 ) minus a fixed consumption rate m. This model assumes that cells in-vivo are controlled by two general proliferation constraints: 1. the web of positive and negative growth signals generated through the cell's direct interactions with other cells and the extracellular matrix and through indirect interactions mediated by various soluble growth factors and 2. the availability of substrate in sufficient quantities to maintain a flux in excess of basal metabolic demands. The former is expressed as a lumped phenomenological population maximum term K(v) and the latter is simplified through examination of the intra and extracellular dynamics of glucose.
The glucose dynamics is given bẏ
where r is glucose delivery rate. We now assume that a, K, and E are normal distribution functions of v with the other parameters constant. In particular we use the following distribution functions
Conditions promoting carcinogenesis
We first examine the conditions in normal tissue that prevent or support carcinogenesis by solving the cell dynamic equations (9) resource dynamic equations (11) and the strategy dynamic equations (3) for equilibrium solutions. We seek equilibrium solutions u, x * , and R * such that u is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS).
An ESS is both ecologically stable (when perturbed, x and R return their equilibrium values for a fixed u) and evolutionarily stable (the same equilibrium solutions are obtained when mutant strategies are introduced to the population). The nature of the equilibrium solutions depend on n s . Consider the case of n s = 1. In this case, assuming x 1 = 0, equilibrium requires
Generally we must solve all three equations simultaneously for the equilibrium values x * 1 , R * , and u 1 . However we may think of using (14) as determining u 1 and we will examine the equilibrium possibility as determined from (12) and (13). For a given u 1 there are two equilibrium solutions possible depending on how
If the second term in (10) is zero, x * 1 is obtained from this expression and R * is obtained from (13) yielding the equilibrium conditions (equilibrium B)
On the other hand, if the third term in (10) is zero, R * is obtained from this expression and x * 1 is obtained from (10) and (13) yielding the equilibrium conditions (equilibrium C)
The equilibrium number of cells is independent of u 1 under equilibrium C. We can now examine both the ecological and evolutionary stability of these two equilibrium solutions. Using an eigenvalue analysis to examine the ecological stability and the adaptive landscape to examine evolutionary stability, we obtain the results given in Table 1 for equilibriums B and C. Evolutionary stability requires ecological stability otherwise the system can never arrive at this equilibrium solution. Therefore, the two off diagonal results are of no interest. If the critical condition r < mK m is met, Fig. 4 illustrates that equilibrium C is at a maximum point on the adaptive landscape. This solution is ecologically stable and can not be invaded by mutant phenotypes. If r > mK m , Fig. 4 illustrates that equilibrium B is at a local minimum point on the adaptive landscape. This solution can be invaded by mutant phenotypes unless some cooperative mechanism is in place (i.e., the interplay between oncogenes and tumor suppressor genes) that does not allow a cell to enter a cell cycle unless conditions are favorable to producing a perfect clone. Which equilibrium state corresponds to the normal state? We work from the following observations made from previous clinical studies:
(1) In normal philological conditions, each cell population remains at K(u 1 ) for that particular tissue (implies equilibrium B for normal cells). (2) Substrate concentrations remain stable in normal tissue requiring regulatory mechanisms adjust blood flow so that r is slightly greater than mK m (implies equilibrium B for normal cells). (3) Mutations in either the oncogene or tumor suppressor gene will give false information to the nucleus overcoming normal tissue controls on cell proliferation allowing clonal expansion of the mutant population (implies that n s goes from 1 to 2 or more during proliferation). (4) Once a population of proliferating cells develops, the cells will have to take up more substrate at existing conditions. This will increase the number of glucose transporters on the cell membrane (implies that the value of u 1 for normal cells will be smaller than the value of u 2 for tumor cells). (5) Tissue that is developing cancer becomes crowded. (6) Some cell populations form small polyps (benign tumor growth) that remain small after many years. Other populations form large polyps that frequently go on to form cancers.
Observations (1) and (2) imply that normal cells lie at a minimum point on the adaptive landscape corresponding to equilibrium B with r > mK m . This explains why clonal expansion is possible in observation (3). By introducing (4) into our model below, we observe (5) and (6).
A route to carcinogenesis
To make the model as realistic as possible we will assume that the critical substrate is glucose and use parameter values available in the literature Hatanaka (1974) . The cell numbers are normalized to 10 6 cells (i.e., x = 1000 ⇒ 10 9 cells) with the above values are converted to consistent units for use with the model. In addition some additional parameters need to be specified for use with the distribution functions. Table 3 . Distribution function parameters.
If normal cells could evolve, they would arrive at equilibrium B or C depending on the valued used for r. For example choosing r = 0.9mN mean we obtain equilibrium C with x * 1 = 900, u = 1, N * = 1525 or using r = 1.2mN mean we obtain equilibrium B with
These are the two cases illustrated in Fig. 4 . As previously noted, the evolutionarily unstable equilibrium B is evidently the normal cell case. Such an equilibrium presents opportunities for speciation to take place Cohen et al. (1999) (or invasion by mutant phenotypes) and can only be maintained through the "cooperative" efforts of the oncogene and tumor suppressor genes. The situation changes somewhat when rare mutant cells are able to establish themselves, but the oncogene and tumor suppressor genes have not been sufficiently damaged so that the mutant cells can evolve. We use the initial conditions ('1' refers to the normal cells and '2' refers to the mutant cells)
with σ 1 = σ 2 = 0 (no evolution allowed for either the normal or mutant cells) and keep r = 1.2mN mean With n s = 2, the system does not quickly achieve an equilibrium solution. For example after a 10 year simulation run t f = 3650 days, we obtain u 1 (t f ) = 1, u 2 (t f ) = 0.9, x 1 (t f ) = 992.7, x 2 (t f ) = 7.5, R(t f ) = 1707.
Equilibrium under these conditions requires about 80 years (x 1 (t f ) = 640, x 2 (t f ) = 367, R(t f ) = 1701) at which time the mutant cells would have turned into a relatively large tumor.
Carcinogenesis starts when the constraints on the mutant cells are removed that allow them to evolve. We simulate this by using as initial conditions the final conditions obtained from the 10 year run with σ 1 = 0, σ 2 = 0.1, and set
to reflect changing environmental conditions due to the presence of an increasing number of mutant cells (see observations noted above). Running the simulation for two years, t f = 730 results in
The adaptive landscape illustrated in Fig. 5 shows that during this period of time the mutant tumor cells have evolved onto a cancer by arriving at a maximum on the adaptive landscape. Crowding is now apparent (x 1 (t f ) + x 2 (t f ) > 1000) as the cancer has made substantial inroads. Figure 6 illustrates the speed at which the cancer develops after the constraints have been removed that allow the mutant cells to evolve. 
Conclusion
Although conclusions based on the first model must be drawn with some caution, the analysis clearly raise doubts that cancer therapy based solely on systemic cytotoxic drugs will ever successfully eradicate a broad range of tumors. A therapeutic strategy that relies solely on killing tumor cells that have the ability to evolve means that they will inevitably rebound unless all proliferative cells within the population are eliminated. In other words, any therapy relying solely on tumor cytotoxic effects will be curative only if it is sufficiently effective to overcome the tumor phenotypic diversity such that it kills all proliferative cells in a time period sufficiently short to prevent evolution of resistance.
In the second model, we have presented a quantitative model of carcinogenesis that can provide a framework of understanding for organization of extant data, integration and interpretation of new information, and guidance for future experiments. The clinical and biological relevance of these models is most evident in the organizational benefits it provides. That is, although many phenomena in carcinogenesis are clear, their precise relationships to each other and to the global process of malignant transformation are poorly defined in the absence of a generalized model. We find that these elementary models for cell growth and resource dynamics develop features that mimic many properties of carcinogenesis. We do not consider this to be coincidental for two reasons: First we are working from a well known mechanistic model and second we are using actual data for estimating parameter values. The work presented here represents an initial effort and will undoubtedly undergo revision as new experimental data accumulate.
